Globalization, the Paradox of Security Discourse and Change in Turkey by Çelenk, Ayşe Aslıhan
 
 




The security discourse in Turkey has been one of the prominent issues in the debates 
about the prospects for democratization and political change in the country. Its 
prevalence is due to the strength of the military’s monopoly over the definition of 
threats and appropriate responses to these threats in addition to its involvement in 
Turkish political life. As the key actor in determining the security discourse in 
Turkey, the military faced a new challenge in the 1990s. On one hand, as a 
consequence of globalization, new threats emerged, requiring the broadening of the 
scope of security measures, and thus increasing the power of the military as an 
institution. On the other hand, new norms of democratic governance promoted by 
international actors, especially the European Union, required a reassessment of 
security and the role of the military in Turkish politics. This paper analyzes the 
paradox of security discourse in Turkey as a result of these two challenges and 
discusses the possibilities for changing the Turkish security discourse along more 
democratic lines and the success of attempts to achieve this. However, in order to do 
this, the paper first discusses the traditional security discourse of Turkey and how its 
scope was broadened in the 1990s. 
 
 2 
2. The National Security Discourse in Turkey 
“Turkey’s definition of security has been more in military than non-military terms”1 
and the main concern has been the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state 
and prevention of threats that could easily arise from Turkey’s unique regional 
position and strategic importance. The focus on the military aspect of security 
reinforced the importance and power of the military over civilian institutions and 
facilitated the establishment of the military’s monopoly over the definition of 
Turkey’s security discourse. 
 
Historical factors also contributed to the establishment of the military’s monopoly. 
The importance of military conquests for the continuation of state power during the 
Ottoman era,2 the lack of a tradition of separating civilian authority from military 
authority and the army’s priority in the modernization process increased the influence 
of the military in political life.3 The role played by officers during the Turkish War of 
Independence as the leaders of the struggle and the founders of the republic also 
legitimized the existence of the military in political life afterwards.4 As the founding 
institution of the republic, the military took over the role of the “guardian of norms 
and core institutions of the Ataturkian legacy”5 and this self-appointed guardian role 
enabled the army to define the ideology of the state and the threats to state and its 
ideology, and justified its interventions into civilian politics at different times. The 
resulting structure was a democracy under the tutelage of the military, which could 
interfere in politics when the civilians failed to cope with threats to the integrity of the 




“The founders of the state and the bureaucratic-military elite that succeeded them 
envisaged a controlled linear course for Turkish development”.8 However, especially 
in the 1990s, this idea of social engineering proved to be difficult because of the 
globalization process that initiated new internal conflicts. Kurdish separatism, the 
intensifying PKK violence and the rise of political Islam were the major domestic 
problems of the period and these problems initiated a redefinition of the national 
security discourse in Turkey. As guardians of the regime, the military perceived these 
problems as internal threats to the character of the state and redefined security 
discourse accordingly, broadening its scope to internal as well as external threats.9 
The broadening of this security understanding as “equal to the protection of the 
existence of the state and the nation against internal and external threats”10 provided a 
wide range of areas in which the military can interfere legally and legitimately. 
According to the perceptions of the military, the civilian establishment has not been 
adequate to deal with the new internal threats successfully11 and the army has a 
legitimate role to intervene and protect the integrity of the state because it is above 
political conflict and has always defended the common interest of the people.12 
 
While the domestic political environment of the 1990s reinforced the supremacy of 
the military over civilian institutions, Turkey’s EU accession process, which gained 
pace during the same period, and the pressure coming from the EU-level for structural 
reform and democratization, challenged this supremacy and provided an opportunity 
for redefining the security discourse in Turkey. 
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3. The EU Impact and the Redefinition of Security Discourse 
The most important impact of the EU accession process in terms of redefinition of the 
Turkish security discourse has been creating the opportunity for the discussion of its 
nature and determination. Because of the pressures coming from the EU-level for the 
improvement of democratic governance structures and structural reforms, the question 
of who determines Turkey’s security priorities and policies has come onto the agenda 
and the role of the military in the process, which was previously taken for granted, 
began to be discussed. According to the Accession Partnership Documents of 2001 
and 2003 Turkey was expected, as a part of the political criteria of membership, to 
make the necessary legal changes in the composition and functioning of the National 
Security Council (NSC) in order to increase civilian control over the policy-making 
processes.13 
 
In order to respond to these demands for structural reform, in 2001 and 2003, 
important legal changes were made within the context of EU harmonization packages, 
which could have substantial impacts on the security discourse in Turkey in the long-
run. With these changes, the number of the civilian members in the NSC was 
increased, it became possible for a civilian to be appointed as the Secretary General of 
the Council, the number of the Council meetings was decreased and the Council 
began to meet bimonthly instead of monthly. In addition, Council decisions were no 
longer binding over the Council of Ministers and it became an advisory body.14 
 
These changes, carried out by the civilian politicians, were not contested by the 
military despite the risk of losing its prominent position in identifying Turkey’s 
security discourse. The main reason for this attitude has been the military’s traditional 
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pro-Western and pro-modernization position, which also entailed supporting Turkey’s 
EU membership. Once it became apparent that certain reforms were necessary for the 
continuation of the process, the military opted for not openly resisting and advocated 
a selective and gradual change,15 in order to protect its key position. Although the 
changes in the composition and powers of the NSC are an important step for the re-
conceptualization of Turkey’s security discourse, the lack of parliamentary control 
over military spending, the immunity of the decisions of  the High Military Council 
(which is responsible for the appointment, retirement and discipline decisions about 
the officers) from judicial review, and the position of the Chief of General Staff as 
directly responsible to the Prime Minister instead of the Ministry of Defence, show 
that the changes are far from guaranteeing civilian control in determining the security 
discourse of the country. 
 
The EU accession process created an impact in Turkey, which may be called a “first 
generation security sector reform”,16 with the initiation of discussions about the 
discourse and the role of civilian and military actors in conducting the country’s 
security policy. In other words, the EU factor has created a contradictory impact to the 
new threat understanding of the 1990s and certain challenges stemming from 
historical and political dynamics affected the prospects of discourse change during the 
EU accession process. 
 
4. The Challenges of Security Discourse Change in Turkey 
The most important challenge of changing the security discourse in Turkey stems 
from the nature of the process of conceptualizing security itself. The definition of 
security priorities, threats and responses are inherently political processes, whose 
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outcomes depend on the preferences and powers of the related actors, i.e. the military 
and civilian political authorities. In Turkey, the National Security Policy Document, 
which reflects the security discourse of the country, has been revised three times in 
1992, 1997 and 2005. In 1992, the separatist activities were added as a threat to 
country’s security and in 1997 religious fundamentalism officially became a threat for 
the country. In 2005, the scope of the internal threats remained unchanged and each 
revision of the document reflected the security understanding of the military because 
of its traditional monopoly in this area. 
 
The military’s traditional monopoly has been strengthened by the lack of interest 
amongst civilian actors in terms of dealing with security matters.17 The lack of 
civilian capacity in terms of knowledge, expertise and policy-making experience in 
these matters and the anxiety of political insecurity on behalf of the civilian 
politicians, which was institutionalized through the military interventions, reinforced 
the military’s role as the actor that determines Turkey’s security discourse. 
 
Despite the EU harmonization reforms and related legal changes, this role of the 
military remains unchanged because the informal mechanisms through which the 
army exerts its influence over politics and society remain intact. These mechanisms, 
such as compulsory military service, which also entails an ideological education 
process, the compulsory national security course taught in high schools by a military 
officer and the participation of the army in economic life through its firms, are still 
utilized by the military in order to retain its legitimate and above-politics guardianship 
role in the society in spite of the loss of certain of its powers with the new laws. The 
latest developments regarding the ongoing investigation about illegal relations and 
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coup attempts of certain retired generals and military officers may, however, have a 
decreasing impact over the legitimacy and credibility of the army in the eyes of the 
public in the long-run and thus limit the informal channels of impact for the military. 
 
Despite the changing image of the military for the public and the decreasing ‘political’ 
powers of the military, the traditional understanding of security itself remains as a 
challenge for changing the security discourse in Turkey. The traditional approach to 
security has been to prioritize the territorial security of the state over security of the 
people. In other words, the security understanding that neglects the societal 
dimensions of security, which would guarantee an environment conducive to 
individual rights and freedoms, gave leverage to the military over the civilians in 
terms of determining the basic premises of the security discourse and prevented the 
development of civilian capacity. This understanding remains unchanged in Turkey as 
the unchallenged concept of internal threats and the methods, which are used to deal 
with them, reveal. The change of security discourse entails a change in the security 
priorities and strategies of the state and, up to this point, the policy makers seem to be 
resistant to the idea of initiating this change. 
 
The final challenge for changing the security discourse in Turkey is the reluctance of 
the civilian actors and the EU, who are expected to be the pioneers of 
democratization, to take the initiative. As the draft of the ‘civilian’ constitution—
which did not bring any changes in the composition and duties of NSC18—reveals, the 
civilian actors refrain from openly challenging the security discourse or the military 
and opt for minor changes. The main reasons for this choice are their concerns about 
political stability and their own political security. Although the progress reports 
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criticize Turkey for the role of the military in domestic politics and point out the need 
for an increase in civilian democratic control over the army, the EU also does not 
openly challenge the traditionally strong role of the army in Turkish politics and 
society mainly because of its sensitivity about the internal dynamics of Turkish 
politics and its reluctance to change the balance of power between the military and 
civilian political actors.19 The passive attitude of the civilian initiative and the EU 
leads to a status quo in terms of the security discourse in Turkey and although the EU 
accession process has created an opportunity for change, these challenges prevent its 




The traditional security understanding in Turkey has prioritized the security of the 
state and its borders over the security of the individual and thus the discourse was 
shaped along military lines and by the military itself. The internal threat 
understanding of the 1990s strengthened the role of the military, while the EU 
accession process required a re-assessment of this situation. Although this constitutes 
an opportunity for defining the Turkish security understanding in terms of the human 
security aspect and along more democratic and civilian lines, the power relations 
between the military and civilian actors, the lack of civilian capacity for dealing with 
security matters, the resistant nature of the traditional security understanding and the 
reluctance of both the civilian actors and the EU to openly challenge the issue because 
of their concerns about political stability, have so far prevented the initiation of a 
process of discourse change in Turkish security policy.20 
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